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When making choices, decision makers often either lack information about al-
ternatives or lack the cognitive capacity to analyze every alternative. To capture
these situations, we formulate a framework to study behavioral search by utilizing
the idea of consideration sets. Consumers engage in a dynamic search process. At
each stage, they consider only those options in the current consideration set. We
provide behavioral postulates that characterize this model. We illustrate how one
can identify both search paths and preferences.
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dependent choice, revealed preference.
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1. Introduction
Classical choice theory assumes that a decision maker (DM) chooses the best option
among all available alternatives. This might not be practical, especially in situations
where (i) a DM cannot easily view all the alternatives and she must actively seek out
alternatives, as when she buys a house or a car (incomplete information), or (ii) there is
a menu in front of her, but either the menu is too long or her time is too short (limited
cognitive capacity).1 In these situations, the budget set must be explored by the DM. As
Herbert Simon pointed out many years ago, exploration of the budget set is one of the
most important aspects of real world decision making, but is neglected in the standard
theory where the whole budget set is assumed to be evaluated simultaneously.
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This paper proposes a new descriptive model of decision making in which a DM ex-
plores her budget set (unlike the standard model) and has a stable preference (as in the
standard model). Our procedure is dynamic and incorporates the idea of limited search
into a model of decision making. We utilize consideration sets, which have been exten-
sively studied in marketing.2 A consideration set is the subset of all available options to
which the DM pays attention.
While the notion of consideration sets is consistent with standard search theory
(Stigler 1961, McCall 1970, Mortensen 1970), there is ample evidence that consumers use
heuristic decision rules to determine their consideration sets (Hauser 2010, Gigerenzer
and Selten 2001).3 We do not take a stand on which explanations for consideration sets
are most plausible. Instead we treat the consideration sets as latent variables and infer
both consideration sets and preferences from observed choice behavior.
The novelty of this paper is to model explicitly how the consideration set of a DM
evolves during the course of search. The economics literature only recently began
to study the effects of limited consideration in market environments (Chioveanu and
Zhou forthcoming, Eliaz and Spiegler 2011a, 2011b, Goeree 2008, Hendricks et al. 2012,
Jeziorski and Segal 2010, Piccione and Spiegler 2012). No one yet has provided a general
model of how a DM forms consideration sets over time while choosing among options.
This paper provides such a model by linking the formation of consideration sets to a
search process.
Our decision procedure is dynamic because interim decisions about what items to
pay attention to affect the evolution of the consideration set. Consider a consumer who
is searching for a digital camera. She begins with a tiny amount of knowledge relative to
the vast array of products available. Suppose she utilizes an e-commerce site to explore
alternatives. First, she looks up a particular camera that she has heard about. Then
the website recommends several other cameras. The recommendations influence her
choice of what to examine next and when to stop searching. When she stops searching,
she chooses the best alternative from the entire consideration set. We call such behav-
ior choice by iterative search (CIS). In this model, the consideration set evolves during
the course of search because the items observed during the search (history) trigger ad-
ditional search.
There are two plausible interpretations of our model. The first is that the evolution of
the consideration set reflects a mental process of the DM. Although there is no explicit
search process, the consumer is only able to consider a subset of all available options
at any given time. For instance, she may consider only options that are similar to the
best item she has already investigated. Under this interpretation, our model becomes
a model of an internal process of decision making, even when all options appear to be
available.
The second interpretation is that consideration sets are shaped by the environment
faced by the DM. For example, a consumer buying items online is often presented with
2See Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990), Roberts and Lattin (1991), and Nedungadi (1990).
3There is also ample experimental evidence that people do not search the way theory predicts (Hey 1982,
1987, Kogut 1990, Moorthy et al. 1997, Zwick et al. 2003, Gabaix et al. 2006, Brown et al. 2011). Instead of
optimally searching, subjects use heuristics to decide whether to continue.
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options related to what she is examining. These related options, which are provided by
the seller, might form the consideration set of the consumer at any given moment. As
the consumer clicks through to look at different items, the consideration set evolves.
Although we will discuss our model in terms of search, the reader should keep in mind
that the search may be entirely a mental process.
In Section 2 we introduce and characterize a general CIS model, where the history
and the feasible set affect the consideration set in an arbitrary manner. Because of the
generality of the model, inference about consideration sets and preferences is limited.
However, this model is still useful both because it identifies the largest class of choice
behaviors that might result from limited search rather than changing preferences and
because it acts as a benchmark to compare with models where additional structure is
imposed on consideration sets.4
In Section 3, we study a special class of CIS models where each consideration set de-
pends only on the best alternative previously observed. This model matches important
real world situations, such as Internet shopping websites that recommend alternatives
to a product being considered. For example, amazon.com provides information about
alternatives in a section called, “What do customers ultimately buy after viewing this
item?” The restricted CIS model can be seen as a model of dynamic status quo bias,
where the status quo is always the best element in the current consideration set. The
current status quo restricts the set of options the DM is willing to consider. The DM will
continue to change her status quo until the current status quo is better than all elements
in the status quo’s consideration set.
We characterize the model and identify behavioral patterns that are consistent with
this consideration set formation process. The restriction improves the predictive power
of the CIS model and still allows for choice reversals and cyclical behavior. The restricted
CIS model provides richer information about the process that leads up to the final choice
and about the DM’s preferences. The restricted CIS model can be used to pin down
uniquely the path a DM follows during her search from her choice data.
This analysis assumes that the available data about the DM’s choices are slightly
richer than the standard choice data: we observe not only her choice, but also her start-
ing point. The starting point of a search is the alternative that the DM initially pays
attention to. There are many potential reasons for a particular starting point. For exam-
ple, a starting point could be (i) the default option, (ii) the last purchase or status quo,
(iii) a product advertised to the DM, or (iv) a recommendation from someone in the
DM’s social network.5 With the explosion of data mining technologies, observability of
such data is more plausible. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that starting points will not
be observable in some situations. In Section 4, we identify both the general CIS model
and the restricted CIS model using only standard choice data.
4In addition, this model provides a new tool for understanding the market interactions between profit-
maximizing firms and boundedly rational consumers. Using two special cases of our model, Eliaz and
Spiegler (2011a, 2011b) illustrate the usefulness of the CIS model in explaining observed economic behavior
that is inconsistent with conventional models.
5Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Salant and Rubinstein (2008), and Bernheim and Rangel (2009) use similar
domains in which x0 is interpreted as a status quo, as a frame, and as ancillary conditions, respectively.
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Section 5 discusses the relation between CIS and three branches of decision theory:
search, limited attention, and reference-dependent choice. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
Throughout the paper, X denotes an arbitrary nonempty finite set, with each element of
X a potential choice alternative. Let K(X) denote the set of all nonempty subsets of X .
An extended choice problem is a pair (Sx), where S ∈K(X) is a feasible set (budget set)
and x ∈ S is a starting point. We interpret this to mean that the individual is confronted
with the problem of choosing an alternative from a feasible set S and her search starts
with x.
An extended choice function assigns a single chosen element to each extended choice
problem. That is, c(Sx) ∈ S for every extended choice problem. Before we introduce
our main concept, choice by iterative search, we formally define its two basic compo-
nents: preference relations and consideration sets.
A preference relation, which is typically denoted by , is a strict order over X as in
the standard theory.6 If x y for all y ∈ S \ {x}, we call x the -best in S.
Suppose that at the beginning of a particular stage of search in the extended choice
problem (Sx), a DM has already considered a set of alternatives A⊆ S, which we call a
history. Given a history, the consideration set after A under choice problem S consists
of all alternatives that the DM will have considered by the end of this stage, which is
denoted by (AS). The set (AS) is defined for each A and S (A ⊆ S), and satisfies
A ⊆ (AS) ⊆ S. Notice that (AS) represents the entire set of items considered in
the search process. Thus, the set of new items searched in this stage is (AS) \A. We
call  a consideration set mapping.
Definition. An extended choice function c is a choice by iterative search (CIS) if there
exist a preference  and a consideration set mapping  such that, for every extended
choice problem (Sx), there exists a sequence of histories A0 (= {x}), A1    An with
n≥ 0 and
• (AkS)=Ak+1 for k= 0     n− 1, and (AnS)=An
• c(Sx) is the -best element in An.
In this case, we say c is represented by (). We may also say that  represents c, which
means that there exists some  such that () represents c.
The consideration set in the CIS model evolves depending on a starting point. Given
(Sx), the DM first considers all elements in ({x} S) = A1. Given history A1, she
further searches and considers all elements in (A1 S) = A2 (in this stage, she finds
A2 \ A1). The search process ends when the decision maker is convinced there is no
need for additional search, so (AnS)=An. At this point, she chooses the best element
6A binary relation  on X is a strict order over X if it is asymmetric (x  y implies not y  x) and nega-
tively transitive (not x y and not y  z imply not x z).
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in An. Mathematically, An is a fixed point of the consideration set mapping given S.
Since {An} is an expanding sequence in K(S), which is finite, a fixed point is eventually
reached regardless of the starting point.
Characterization
We first characterize the most general version of CIS where the history and the feasible
set affect the consideration set in an arbitrary manner. Not surprisingly, the general CIS
model does not provide a very strong prediction. Nevertheless, we provide the charac-
terization so as to draw the boundaries of the current framework. The general CIS model
identifies choice behavior that might result from limited search. Within this class, seem-
ingly irrational choice behavior can be generated, even with stable preferences. In other
words, context-dependent preferences are not necessary to explain choice anomalies.
We use the general CIS model as a benchmark for comparison with models where we
make additional assumptions about consideration sets.
In this benchmark case, we do not impose any structure on consideration sets. The
restrictions imposed by the model come only from revealed preference. Indeed, the
necessary and sufficient condition for the model is equivalent to acyclicity of revealed
preference. We next illustrate how to elicit preference in our framework.
Suppose we observe c(Sx) = x. The standard theory concludes that x is preferred
to any other alternative in S. To justify such an inference, one must implicitly assume
that the consideration set is equal to S. Without this assumption, we cannot make any
inference, because it is possible that x is the worst alternative, but the final consideration
set consists of only x (i.e., the decision maker does not search at all). Therefore, the
choice does not reveal any information about preferences.
However, if a decision maker chooses x from some set for which y is the starting
point, we must conclude that x is better than y. Formally, for any two distinct x and y,
define x c y if c(S y) = x. We now state a postulate in terms of observables and then
show that it implies that c is acyclical.
Dominating Anchor. For any budget set S, there is some alternative x∗ ∈ S such that
c(Tx∗) /∈ S \ {x∗} for all T  x∗.
By contradiction, we show that the Dominating Anchor axiom implies that c is
acyclical. Assume c satisfies the Dominating Anchor axiom and c is cyclic. If elements
of S form a cycle in terms of c , this means that for every alternative x ∈ S, there exists
another item y ∈ S \ {x} such that y = c(Tx) for some T , which violates the Dominat-
ing Anchor axiom. Hence, c cannot have a cycle. We now state our characterization
theorem.
Theorem 1. An extended choice function c obeys the Dominating Anchor axiom if and
only if c is a CIS. Moreover,  represents c if and only if  includes the transitive closure
of c .
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Proof. Suppose c satisfies the Dominating Anchor axiom.7 As shown above, c is
acyclical. Therefore, there exists a preference that includes c . Take one of these
preferences arbitrarily, say , and define ({x} S) := {x c(Sx)}, and for all other A,
(AS) := A. Now we show that () represents c. If x = c(Sx), by construc-
tion, ({x} S) = {x}, so the decision maker stops searching immediately. Suppose
c(Sx) = y = x. Then ({x} S) = {x y} = ({x y} S). By the construction of c , we
have y c x, so it is y  x. So y is the -best element of ({x y} S). Therefore, ()
represents c. Moreover, since  can be any preference including c , this proves the “if”
part of the second claim. The “only if” part is given above. 
The second claim in the theorem illustrates the extent to which we can identify the
DM’s preference through the choice data. To answer this question, we use the notion of
revealed preference introduced by Masatlioglu et al. (2012), where multiple preferences
may represent a single choice function.8 In Masatlioglu et al.’s (2012) definition, x is re-
vealed to be preferred to y if and only if every preference representing the choice behavior
ranks x above y. Adopting this notion, the second claim of Theorem 1 implies that the
transitive closure of c fully characterizes the revealed preference of the CIS model, be-
cause every preference that represents c must respect c and any preference doing so
represents c. In other words, the necessary and sufficient condition for concluding x is
preferred to y is that x is ranked above y according to the transitive closure of c .
As a final word, we highlight one important limitation of the general CIS model. As
the proof of Theorem 1 illustrates, it is possible to explain any choice function generated
by the general CIS model as if the DM always ends her search after the first iteration. In
other words, the general CIS model is behaviorally equivalent to the static model where
the DM simply chooses the best element of ({x} S). The general CIS model is, there-
fore, not informative about search behavior.9 In the next section, we impose a realistic
and reasonable restriction on consideration sets. We illustrate that this restriction not
only delivers more information about true preference, but also provides a full identifi-
cation result about the search path.
3. Markovian CIS
Consider a consumer using an internet commerce site to buy a cell phone. On the page
for each phone, the internet commerce site suggests several alternatives under a head-
ing such as “What do customers ultimately buy after viewing this item?” (amazon.com).
The consumer first visits the page for her starting point and considers the alternatives
suggested by the site. She then jumps to the page for the phone she prefers among those
7The proof of the “if” part of the first claim in Theorem 1 is left to the reader.
8Revealed preference with multiple representations is also studied by Ambrus and Rozen (2008), Caplin
and Dean (2011), Cherepanov et al. (2013), Green and Hojman (2007), Manzini and Mariotti (2009, 2012).
9Even though there is no difference between the dynamic and the static model for our characterization,
the difference could be substantial when one utilizes this model in applications. For example, one might
be concerned about implications of a policy that affects the DM’s consideration set mapping. A policy that
expands her consideration set mapping (i.e., (AS) gets bigger for any (AS)) will always make the DM
weakly better off under the static model, but not necessarily under the dynamic model.
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Figure 1. Graphical illustrations: (a) full search, (b) partial search, and (c) no search.
alternatives, where she finds a new set of suggested phones. She looks for the best phone
within the new suggestions and repeats the process. She stops searching when she finds
a phone for which there is no better alternative among those suggested on its page.
Under this strategy, the range of the next search depends only on the best alternative
already encountered. We call such a procedure Markovian CIS. Formally, the decision
maker’s consideration set mapping has the structure
(AS)= (∗(xA)∩ S)∪A (1)
where xA is the best item in A, ∗ is a mapping from X to K(X), and x ∈ ∗(x). The
term ∗(x) represents the set of suggested alternatives at the page of x (the considera-
tion set of x). Sometimes, a suggested item may not be available. Thus, what the con-
sumer can actually compare are those items included in the intersection, ∗(xA)∩S. We
call mapping ∗ the Markovian consideration set . We also say that (∗) represents a
Markovian CIS c if c is represented by (), where  is defined by (1). Under the as-
sumption that consideration sets are Markovian, we can provide a graphical illustration
for the CIS model. In Figure 1, each node corresponds to a particular alternative, and
the positions of nodes represent preferences: the higher the position is, the better the
alternative is (x t  y  z). A connection between two alternatives indicates that each
of them belongs to the consideration set of the other.10 We illustrate three cases from
one extreme to the other with four alternatives in Figure 1(a)–(c): while (a) represents a
standard decision maker (independent of starting point, the decision maker considers
all feasible alternatives, hence always chooses the best alternative), in (c), she does not
consider anything other than the starting point, hence she sticks to the starting point no
matter what the budget set is. The interesting case is Figure 1(b): the DM’s best option
x is visible from y but not from z. Therefore, she cannot reach x when z is the starting
point unless y is available. In other words, to choose x, she needs to follow the path
z → y → x.
Under the Markovian structure, the search stops whenever the best item so far is
also best within its own consideration set. To see this, suppose the decision maker has
history A in which x is the best element and it is also best in ∗(x) ∩ S. Then her next
10A directed graph can be used to illustrate asymmetric membership of consideration sets: only one of
them is the consideration set of the other.
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consideration set will be A′ = (∗(x) ∩ S) ∪A, so x is still the best item. Therefore, her
next consideration set is also A′, so she stops searching and chooses x.
Markovian CIS is a plausible model of search not only for those searching the inter-
net, but also for many other scenarios.
• The set ∗(x) includes alternatives that have similar attributes or overlapping fea-
tures with x, for example, “comps” of a house. It is natural to assume that deci-
sion makers who are considering whether to purchase a house compare it only to
houses in a similar price range, rather than all available houses.
• Depending on the best item a decision maker has observed so far, some cues (or
aspects) of items might look more important than others. The decision maker
considers only terms that dominate the current one in these cues. Hence ∗(x)
excludes alternatives that incur loss relative to x in any of these cues.
• Depending on trade-offs, some binary comparisons could be difficult. To avoid
these difficult trade-offs, the decision maker considers only items that are easy to
compare to x.
Characterization
Now, we draw the boundaries for the empirical scope of the Markovian CIS model. To do
this, we present a set of postulates that are both necessary and sufficient for Markovian
CIS.
The first postulate is a stronger version of the Dominating Anchor axiom, which en-
sures the acyclicity of the revealed preference. Given the additional structure of the con-
sideration set mapping, the Markovian CIS model generates more revealed preference.
For example, if x = c({x y} y) but x = c(S y) implies that x must be inferior to c(S y)
according to the Markovian CIS model, but it may not be in the general CIS model. Thus,
we need the following axiom.
A1 (Strong Dominating Anchor). For any S, there is some alternative x∗ ∈ S such that for
any y ∈X , if x∗ = c({x∗ y} y), then c(T y) /∈ S \ {x∗} for all T including x∗.
Notice that the Dominating Anchor axiom is the special case of A1 when y = x∗. If
the axiom is violated, then for every alternative in S, there exists another alternative in
S that is superior. Therefore, the violation of this axiom implies that S does not have a
most preferred alternative, which is a contradiction. We discuss the revealed preference
of the Markovian CIS model in detail in the next subsection.
The next postulate states conditions under which an alternative is irrelevant for a
fixed starting point. An alternative is irrelevant if adding it to a choice set does not
affect the choice. First, fix the starting point, say x. If y is irrelevant in {xz}, i.e.,
c({xz}x) = c({x y z}x), then in the classical choice theory, y is also irrelevant in any
decision problem whenever z is present. In other words, the presence of z makes y glob-
ally irrelevant. Our next postulate is a weaker version of this idea. For an alternative to
be irrelevant globally in the presence of z, it must be irrelevant in {xz} and it must also
dominate the starting point (y = c({x y}x)).
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A2 (Irrelevance). Assume y = c({x y}x). Then c({x y z}x) = c({xz}x) implies
c(Sx)= c(S ∪ yx) for any S including z.
We now illustrate that this is a necessary condition of Markovian CIS. The assump-
tions of the postulate imply that both y and z belong to the consideration set of x. Since
y is not chosen from ({x y z}x), y is never the best element in the first consideration
set if z is available. This means the alternatives encountered in the next stage is the same
whether y is present or not. Hence this postulate is also necessary.
Next, consider a DM who chooses the starting point x in two different decision prob-
lems. The next postulate requires that she also chooses x when the two budget sets are
combined and x is the starting point.
A3 (Expansion). If x= c(Sx)= c(Tx), then x= c(S ∪ Tx).
It is easy to see that this is a necessary condition of Markovian CIS. If x = c(Sx) =
c(Tx), then there exists no element in S or T such that it is in ∗(x) and better than x.
In this case, the DM sticks to her starting point under the decision problem (S ∪ Tx).
Our final postulate states that if there is only one alternative, say y, that makes the
DM move away from the starting point, say x, then it does not matter whether x or y is
the starting point. In other words, one can replace the starting point with this dominat-
ing alternative.
A4 (Replacement). If c(Sx)= x and c({x y}x)= y, then c(S ∪ yx)= c(S ∪ y y).
Since c({x y}x) = y, we must have c(S ∪ yx) = x. This means the decision maker
must encounter a better alternative than x in the first stage of search. Since c(Sx)= x,
there is only one such alternative, which is y. Then she continues to search as if she
started from y because of the Markovian structure. Thus, in both decision problems
(S∪yx) and (S∪y y), the DM follows the same path and reaches the same final choice,
i.e., c(S ∪ yx)= c(S ∪ y y).11
Theorem 2. An extended choice function c satisfies A1–A4 if and only if c is a Markovian
CIS.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Revealed preference, revealed consideration, and search path
Given that Markovian CIS imposes more structure on the consideration set mapping, we
can infer more about the preference of the DM. We now list three choice patterns that
reveal the DM prefers x over y.
1. Abandonment of the starting point: x= c(S y).
11In the Appendix, we provide examples to illustrate that these four axioms are independent.
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2. Choice reversal: x= c(S ∪ y z) = c(S z).
3. Chosen over a dominating alternative: x= c(S ∪ y z) and y = c({y z} z).
The first choice pattern is straightforward. Indeed, the inference that x is preferred
to y is possible when this choice pattern is observed, even when no structure is imposed
on the consideration set mapping in the general CIS model.
The second choice pattern is a choice reversal, where x is unchosen when a seem-
ingly irrelevant alternative y is removed. Then in the decision problem (S ∪ y z), y must
be the best element at some step of the search process because that is the only way it
can affect the DM’s choice. We can conclude that x is preferred to y because we know
that y was considered and x was chosen. Notice that this inference is not possible with
the general CIS model, in which an element that is not the best at any step may affect
the consideration set and thereby influence the final choice.
In the third choice pattern, x is chosen over y, which dominates the starting point z.
The equality y = c({y z} z) reveals that y is in z’s consideration set. Therefore, anything
chosen over y when z is the starting point must be better than y.
Any preference that can represent c must be consistent with the above revelations.
Formally, given a Markovian CIS c, let
xc y if one of above three choice patterns is observed
and let TCc be the transitive closure of c . If x TCc y, then we can conclude the DM
prefers x over y. The converse is also true: any preference that respects TCc represents
c as well. Thus, TCc fully characterizes the revealed preference of the Markovian CIS
model. The next proposition states these facts formally.
Proposition 1 (Revealed preference). Suppose c is a Markovian CIS. Then x is revealed
to be preferred to y if and only if xTCc y.12
We would like to note that the transitive closure of the binary relation generated by
the third choice pattern (chosen over an dominating alternative) itself fully captures the
revealed preference of the Markovian CIS model. Thus, the first two patterns (abandon-
ing the starting point and choice reversal) may look redundant. For instance, when a
choice reversal is observed, one can prove that x is preferred to y in the sense of the
third condition by seeking more choice data and/or applying the axioms to fill in the
missing choice data. We provide these two conditions explicitly because it eliminates
such a cumbersome requirement and makes Proposition 1 more useful for empirical
studies.
Now we illustrate when we can conclude that x is in the consideration set of y, which
we call the revealed consideration set. As in our definition of the revealed preference
with multiple representations, we say x is revealed (not) to be in the consideration set of
y if every possible Markovian representation of an extended choice function agrees that
x belongs (does not belong) to the consideration set of y.
12All results in this section can be easily verified by the proof of Theorem 2.
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To conclude that x is in y’s consideration set, we need to observe x = c({x y} y).
Notice that it is not enough to observe x = c(S y) because x may be considered only
after the DM switches from y to something else. Alternatively, to infer x is not in y’s
consideration set, we need to observe y = c(S y) for some S and to know x is better
than y. If x were in y’s consideration set, the DM would have abandoned y. The following
remarks summarize these observations.
Remark 1 (Revealed consideration). Suppose c is a Markovian CIS. Then x is revealed
to be in the consideration set of y if and only if y = c({x y}x).
Remark 2 (Revealed inconsideration). Suppose c is a Markovian CIS. Then, x is revealed
not to be in the consideration set of y if and only if y = c(S y) for some S including x and
xTCc y.
Finally, we illustrate what we can infer about the decision making process. For
instance, suppose c({x y z}x) = y. We may wonder if the DM finds y immediately
(in the consideration set of x) or finds y only after inspecting z. If we also observe
c({x y}x) = x, we can conclude that the DM finds y only after inspecting z, because
this information reveals that y is not included in x’s consideration set. In this way, we
can identify how the DM reaches y, which we call her search path, as x→ z → y.
This idea is generalizable. Suppose we would like to know how the DM reaches the
final choice in (Sx0). We can do so by citing her choice from the set of alternatives that
are known to be in x0’s consideration set. If we let S0 = {y ∈ S :y = c({x0 y}x0)}, her next
point must be c(S0x0). Repeating the process, we can fully identify how she reaches
her final choice (c(Sx0)) from her starting point x0. Thus, her observed choices fully
identify her search path. The following remark formalizes this.
Remark 3. Suppose c is a Markovian CIS. Every Markovian CIS representation of c gen-
erates the same path for every extended decision problem.
The novelty of Remark 3 is that it provides choice-based insights about the process
of search. While the standard search theory informs us of how a DM should behave,
Remark 3 tells us how the DM actually does behave during the search. If the data on the
search path are available, our identification result of the search path (Remark 3) can be
used to test the model in addition to our axiom.
Some behavioral implications of the Markovian CIS model
The Markovian CIS model retains several consistency properties, even though it accom-
modates choice reversal. We highlight the following properties, which are implied by the
set of postulates that characterize the Markovian CIS model (Theorem 2).
• Starting Point Bias: If y = c(Sx), then y = c(S y).
• Starting Point Contraction: If c(Sx)= x, then c(Tx)= x for all T ⊂ S.
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• Sandwich Property: If c(Sx)= c({x y}x)= y and {x y} ⊂ T ⊂ S, then c(Tx)= y.
• Irrelevance of Revealed Inferior Alternatives: If x TCc y, then c(Sx) = c(S ∪ yx)
for all S.
The starting point bias property says that if a decision maker ever chooses y from
(Sx), then her search outcome will be the same when y is the starting point. This prop-
erty appears as the status quo bias axiom in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), which interprets
the starting point as a status quo. In the Markovian CIS model, the final choice must be
best within its own consideration set, and if the DM starts from such an alternative, she
will be unwilling to move away.
The starting point contraction property is a version of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) axiom. This version of the axiom is applicable in the Markovian CIS
model when the DM sticks with her starting point, which she does only if she cannot
find anything better in its consideration set. If she is happy with her starting point when
she faces a large menu, she will still be happy with her starting point when the menu
shrinks.
In general, IIA does not apply if the DM does not stick with her starting point.
This is because removing an alternative that is on the path of search can change the
DM’s path and cause a choice reversal (Figure 1(b)). Thus, the IIA property is pre-
served only when the removed alternative is not on her path of search. For instance, if
c(Sx)= c({x y}x)= y, then we learn that y is reached in the initial iteration of search,
so all other alternatives in S are off the search path. In this case, we can safely state that
removing an alternative (other than x and y) does not affect the DM’s choice, which is
the sandwich property.
The final property—the irrelevance of revealed inferior alternatives property—is
based on the observation that an alternative that is worse than the starting point never
affects the DM’s search behavior. Taking the unobservability of her preferences into ac-
count, this property states that removing an alternative that is revealed to be worse than
the starting point does not change her choice.
Additional knowledge about preference and consideration sets
Although we have characterized the Markovian CIS model under the assumption that
both  and ∗ are unobservable, one can imagine circumstances where these factors
are partially or fully observable. In our example of a DM using a website to explore digi-
tal cameras, we may learn about consideration sets and thereby observe ∗ by inspect-
ing how the website makes suggestions. In a market with identical products, we may
make the reasonable assumption that consumers care only about prices and thereby
observe .
To represent a certain extended choice function by the Markovian CIS model, we
must use certain pairs of a preference and a consideration set mapping, although they
may not be unique. Thus an extended choice function that admits a Markovian CIS
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representation may fail to have a representation that is consistent with extra informa-
tion about the DM’s preference and consideration sets. We are currently addressing this
issue.13
First, consider the case where we fully observe both the DM’s preference  and the
DM’s behavior c. If she follows the Markovian CIS model, the true preference will not
contradict the revealed preference generated by c (TCc by Proposition 1). Conversely,
if there is no contradiction, we can find a consideration set that maps ∗ so that c is
represented by (∗).14 Thus, as long as there is no contradiction between the DM’s
(known) preference and the revealed preference, her behavior can be represented by the
Markovian CIS model.
Indeed, this logic is applicable even when we have only partial information about
the DM’s preference. For instance, we know she prefers x over y, but do not know how
she ranks other elements. In the abstract, we know that her preference must include a
partial order (asymmetric and transitive) ′. The special case of full information about
the DM’s preference is when ′ is complete. The following remark summarizes these
findings and can be easily verified by the proof of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Let c be an extended choice function and let ′ be a partial order over X .
Then there exists a pair of preference andMarkovian consideration setmapping∗ that
represents c, and x y whenever x′ y, if and only if (i) c satisfies A1–A4 and (ii) ′ does
not contradict TCc (there is no x and y such that x′ y but y TCc x).
Next, we study the case where the consideration set is fully observable to be ∗.
Unlike the known preference case, the consistency between revealed (in)consideration
and ∗ is not sufficient for a valid representation. The first extra condition we must
impose is that the DM never moves away from her starting point if we know that she
does not consider anything other than her starting point.
The second condition is about the consistency of the revealed preference gener-
ated by this extra information. Suppose we observe x = c(S z) and it is known that
y ∈ ∗(z).15 Then clearly the DM’s final choice is made after considering y, so we learn
that x is preferred to y. Formally, for any distinct alternatives x and y,
x′c y if and only if c(S z)= x for some z and S  y with y ∈∗(x)
where the possibility of z = y is not excluded. Notice that the revealed preference ′c
due to the extra information about ∗(x) contains more information than the revealed
preference c generated without this information. It happens that z = c({y z} z) and
that y ∈∗(z) is known. Thus, the slightly stronger revealed preference must not have a
contradiction.
13Cherepanov et al. (2013) and Manzini et al. (2011) also study a similar question in different contexts.
14We showed this in the proof of Theorem 2. We can take any completion of c as the preference to
represent a given choice function.
15As we have seen, if y = c({y z} z), then x y is revealed even without the extra information about ∗,
because that choice itself reveals y ∈∗(z).
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It turns out that these two extra conditions, along with all of the axioms in Theo-
rem 2, are sufficient for an extended choice function to be compatible with the Marko-
vian CIS model. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Let c be an extended choice function and let∗ be a Markovian consid-
eration set mapping. Then there exists a preference  such that (∗) represents c if and
only if
(i) c satisfies A1–A4
(ii) if ∗(x)∩ S = {x}, then c(Sx)= x
(iii) ′c has no cycle.
4. Unobservable starting points
Our revealed preference approach is based on the assumption that we can observe not
only what the decision maker chooses from a budget set, but also which alternative she
initially contemplates. However, we can also imagine situations where we observe only
standard choice data and do not observe the starting point. For example, if the starting
point is what the DM expects to buy in the market, it can be difficult to elicit such infor-
mation. Given possible limitations in the data, we investigate how to identify DM’s who
follow an underlying CIS model (general or Markovian).
Suppose the DM actually follows a CIS model denoted by c, but we do not observe
her starting point. We observe her choosing y from S—the only available data. Then
there must exist a starting point that leads her to pick y. Of course, such a starting point
may not be unique; several distinct starting points might result in the same final choice,
y = c(Sx) = c(S z). At the same time, given a fixed budget set, observed final choices
might depend on the starting points, y = c(Sx) and w = c(S z). We define the choice
correspondence induced by c, denoted by Cc :K(X)→K(X), as
y ∈ Cc(S) if there exists x such that y = c(Sx)
In other words, y ∈ Cc(S) means y is chosen from S for some starting point. This is in line
with Sen (1993): “It may be useful to interpret C(S) as the set of ‘choosable’ elements—
the alternatives that may be chosen.”16 Note that x y ∈ Cc(S) does not imply that x is
indifferent to y in our framework. It simply means that both x and y may be chosen
from S, depending on the starting point.
The induced choice correspondence, Cc , is what one can observe when the DM fol-
lows a particular CIS, c, but her starting point is unobservable. In other words, Cc are
the only available data to an outside observer who knows that the choices of the DM are
affected by the starting point but lacks information about the starting point.
16Salant and Rubinstein (2008) also follow this idea in defining a choice correspondence from a frame-
dependent choice function.
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General model
We first start with the general model. Imagine that we observe a choice correspon-
dence C. We would like to determine if there exists a general CIS model, say c, that
induces the observed choice correspondence, i.e., C = Cc . Such a general CIS model
exists if and only if the DM’s choice correspondence satisfies a simple axiom called the
Bliss Point axiom. This result makes it possible to identify DM’s following a CIS even
with standard choice data.
The Bliss Point Axiom (BP). For any set S, some may-be-chosen alternative from S
must always be may-be-chosen from any smaller decision problem: There exists x ∈ C(S)
such that x ∈ C(T) if x ∈ T ⊂ S.17
We call the alternative that satisfies the condition of BP a bliss point of S. By con-
trast, IIA dictates that all may-be-chosen alternatives should be may-be-chosen from
any smaller choice problem (whenever they are available). Therefore, BP relaxes IIA by
requiring that one may-be-chosen element fulfills the condition rather than all may-be-
chosen elements. Even though BP is a weaker condition than IIA, it still does not allow
choice cycles.
We next show that BP guarantees the existence of underlying choice by iterative
search.
Proposition 3. A choice correspondence C satisfies the Bliss Point axiom if and only if
there exists an underlying CIS that induces C.
The power of Proposition 3 is that it connects choice patterns that are considered
“irrational” in traditional choice theory to our choice by iterative search model, which
captures bounded rationality. It provides a very simple and intuitive postulate to identify
CIS decision makers using only choice data.
Markovian
We would like to reconsider the case where our data are limited to the choices from
a choice set—there is no knowledge about starting point. As before, we would like to
identify DM’s who follow an underlying Markovian CIS from such restricted data. If a
choice correspondence C is generated by an acyclical binary relation,18 then there exists
an underlying Markovian CIS that induces C.
Proposition 4. A choice correspondence C can be rationalized by an acyclical binary
relation if and only if there exists an underlying Markovian CIS that induces C.19
17This axiom appears in Agaev and Aleskerov (1993) as “the fixed-point condition” to characterize inter-
val choice models.
18We say that a choice correspondence C is generated by an acyclical binary relation P if C(S)= {x ∈ S |
there exists no y such that y P x}.
19When the starting point is not observable, the Markovian CIS model is observationally equivalent to
Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006) personal equilibrium, which is also generated by an acyclic preference as shown
by Gul and Pesendorfer (2006).
716 Masatlioglu and Nakajima Theoretical Economics 8 (2013)
This provides a very simple test of Markovian CIS using only limited data. In ad-
dition, Proposition 4 makes it possible to identify behavior that is consistent with the
general model but not with the Markovian model, even absent data on starting points.
Therefore, standard choice data alone are enough to make the distinction between the
general and the Markovian CIS models.
Finally, we discuss how and to what extent one can infer the preference of the DM
following the Markovian CIS model from this limited data. First, let us clarify what a
revealed preference means in this context. Since multiple Markovian CIS models can
generate the same choice correspondence C, naturally we define x to be revealed pre-
ferred to y if and only if the preference of every Markovian CIS model generating C ranks
x above y. The proof of Proposition 4 shows that any completion of the acyclical bi-
nary relation rationalizing C represents one of Markovian CIS models generating C (by
choosing ∗ appropriately). Therefore, the transitive closure of this relation is the full
characterization of the revealed preference in this context.
5. Related literature
CIS is related to three branches of decision theory: search, limited consideration, and
reference dependence. We discuss the relationships of both the general CIS model and
the Markovian CIS model to these branches.
Search
Caplin and Dean (2011) also study search by employing the revealed preference ap-
proach. Their model also assumes decision makers have a stable preference. They
utilize a different type of auxiliary data called choice process data. These data include
what the decision maker would choose at any given point in time if she were suddenly
forced to quit searching. The entire path followed during the course of search is the in-
put of their model, rather than its output. The novelty of our approach is that the path
of interim choices (the choice process data) can be uniquely identified by imposing cer-
tain structures—such as that considered in our Markovian CIS model—on consideration
sets.20
Limited consideration
In the recent literature on limited consideration, a DM chooses the best alternative from
a small subset of the available alternatives. In contrast to the CIS model, most of them
focus on some aspects of decision making other than searching. For instance, in many
models of limited consideration, the DM, prior to choosing the most preferred element,
applies some criteria other than her preference to the entire feasible set to eliminate
20Papi (2012), Horan (2010), and Raymond (2011) also analyze choice as a process of search. All of these
papers assume that the order of search is part of the decision problem and is observable to the analyst. In
contrast, in our approach the order of search (except the starting point) is in the mind of the decision maker
and is unobservable to the analyst.
Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) Choice by iterative search 717
some alternatives. Such models include the rational shortlisting (Manzini and Mari-
otti 2007), considering only alternatives that belong to the best category (Manzini and
Mariotti 2012) and considering only alternatives that are optimal according to some ra-
tionalizing criteria (Cherepanov et al. 2013). These procedures cannot be implemented
without knowing the entire feasible set, so these models are inconsistent with an envi-
ronment where the DM must find her alternatives through search.
Salant and Rubinstein (2008) study a decision making process in which the DM con-
siders only the top n elements according to some ranking and chooses her most pre-
ferred element from that restricted consideration set. The model is consistent with a
search environment if the ranking is, for instance, the amount of advertising for an ele-
ment, because limited consideration arises even when the DM is unaware of the entire
feasible set. However, this procedure assumes that she is following a fixed stopping rule
and she does not adjust her search strategy during the search process.
Masatlioglu et al. (2012) provide a model of limited attention, where the considera-
tion set depends only on the budget set, denoted by (S). Unlike the CIS model, their
model is agnostic about how such a consideration set is formed. Instead, they impose
a condition that is satisfied in many environments and procedures. The condition says
that the consideration set is unaffected by removing an alternative that does not attract
attention: x /∈ (S) implies (S)= (S \ x). The final consideration set generated by the
Markovian CIS model (fixing the starting point) satisfies this property.21 Thus, one can
view Masatlioglu et al. (2012) as a reduced-form model. where one of the possible un-
derlying structures is CIS. Nevertheless, the strong structure of the Markovian CIS model
makes it possible to identify more preferences than the limited attention model in the
sense of set inclusion. In Section 3, we illustrate three types of choice patterns that re-
veal the DM’s preference, whereas only choice reversal does so in the limited attention
model.
Reference dependence
The CIS model is also related to the literature on reference-dependent preferences. In
particular, the Markovian CIS model captures dynamic adjustments of the reference
point in search, where the reference point at any given stage is the best element in
the current consideration set. Each reference point restricts the set of options the DM
is willing to currently consider. The DM continues to adjust her reference point until
the current reference point is the best within its consideration set. Previous models of
reference-dependent choices such as Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005), and Salant and Rubinstein (2008) are static—the reference point is exoge-
nously given and fixed.
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) introduce the first reference-dependent model,
where losses have a greater impact than corresponding gains on utility (loss aversion).
Their loss aversion model allows strict cycles: a DM strictly prefers y to x when endowed
with x, strictly prefers z to y when endowed with y, and strictly prefers x to z when
21We should note that the final consideration set generated by the general CIS model might not satisfy
this property, hence their model is more restrictive than our general CIS model.
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endowed with z, i.e., x z z y y x x. In the CIS model, the reference point is aban-
doned only when there is a welfare improvement, so their model is not a special case of
the CIS model. Unlike the DM in this reference-dependent model, the DM in the CIS
model can violate IIA, even for a fixed starting point. Therefore, these two models are
independent.22
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) propose a reference-dependent choice model, where a
DM follows a simple two-stage procedure: elimination and optimization. In the elimi-
nation stage, the DM discards all alternatives other than those that dominate the status
quo (say r) in every (endogenously driven) aspect. Formally, the set of surviving alter-
natives in S is {x ∈ S | ui(x) ≥ ui(r) for all i} ∩ S, where ui represents the ranking in as-
pect i. In the optimization stage, the DM simply chooses the best alternative from the
set of surviving alternatives. For comparison purposes, we interpret the set of the alter-
natives that can survive over the status quo r to be the consideration set of r, denoted
by ∗(r). Thus, the DM’s choice from S is the best alternative in ∗(r) ∩ S. The first
difference between models is that in Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2005) model, decisions are
made just after the first round (static), whereas the final consideration set dynamically
involves the Markovian CIS model. In addition, because of the multi-utility representa-
tion, Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2005) consideration set enjoys a nested structure: x ∈ ∗(y)
implies ∗(x)⊂∗(y), which is not imposed in the Markovian CIS model.
However, the difference between the two models disappears when we also impose
the nested structure on the consideration set of the Markovian CIS model. This is
because once the DM finds the best element in the consideration set of the starting
point, she will not find any more new alternatives in the next consideration set given
the nested structure, so she stops searching immediately, which is behaviorlly equiva-
lent to Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2005) model. Thus, the difference is solely generated by
Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2005) particular structure of the consideration set driven by the
multi-utility representation.
Masatlioglu and Ok (2010) provide a more general version of the status quo bias
model by eliminating the nested structure on ∗. Given the behavioral equivalence be-
tween Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) and the Markovian CIS model with the nested struc-
ture, one may suspect that Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2010) model is equivalent to the Marko-
vian CIS model without any particular structure on ∗. However, the static nature of the
status quo model now makes these two models distinguishable. Let x be the best al-
ternative within ∗(r). Unlike Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2005) model, it is possible that the
consideration set of x contains something better than x. Nevertheless, Masatlioglu and
Ok’s (2010) DM simply picks x, while the Markovian CIS’s DM continues searching. In-
deed, the model in Masatlioglu and Ok (2010) does not allow choice reversals for a fixed
status quo, but the Markovian CIS does. Conversely, the Markovian CIS model satisfies
the following condition: if c(Sx) = y, then c(S y) = y, which is not implied by their
model. In sum, the status quo bias models and the Markovian CIS model are only be-
haviorally equivalent when the consideration set or the set of surviving alternatives has
the nested structure, but this is not the case in general.
22Since the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) is closely related to Tversky and Kahneman (1991), these
differences also apply to their formulation of reference dependence.
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Salant and Rubinstein (2008) study choices in the presence of a framing effect using
the (Af ) model, which is the most general reference-dependent choice model. A frame
f is irrelevant in the rational assessment of alternatives, but nonetheless affects choice.
The CIS model can be thought of as a special case of the (Af ) model by letting the
frame be the starting point.
6. Concluding remarks
We recognize that people must engage in a dynamic process to learn about feasible al-
ternatives, especially in complicated decision problems such as searching for a house.
Thus, we incorporate the idea of search and consideration sets into decision theory to
get new insights into how people make decisions in such circumstances.
We illustrate how to infer a DM’s preference and search process from the choice data
in the Markovian model. The choice data partially distinguish the DM’s preference and
consideration sets. This is useful for firms. For instance, if a product is unpopular, it is
important for a firm to know why. Is it because consumers do not like the product or
because they cannot find the product in the course of their search? These identification
results can help firms identify the reason and react accordingly.
We mention two interesting future directions to explore. The first one is to study the
implications of the CIS model using extended market share data (such as 40% of con-
sumers starting from x end up choosing y) rather than extended individual choice data.
With such limited data, we cannot observe how each individual reacts when the feasi-
ble set or the starting point changes; we can only observe reactions at the aggregated
level. Then a reasonable question is how to identify the distributions of preferences and
consideration sets if each individual follows a Markovian CIS model.
The second direction is to study the effect of framing on consideration sets. While
most of our work makes the useful simplification that consideration sets are affected
only by the history and the feasible set, one could consider cases where consideration
sets are affected by more general framing effects (such as presentation and advertising).
In these cases, the consideration set can be written as (AS f ) or ∗(x f ), where f is
a frame.
Appendix
A.1 Independence of A1–A4
The following examples illustrate that, in our characterization for the Markovian model,
no axiom can be disposed without affecting the characterization. We drop each axiom,
one at a time, in their numerical order.
• If the consideration set mapping, ∗, is allowed to depend on the starting point,
one can create examples where A1 is violated and the rest of the axioms are satis-
fied.
• If the pair (∗) is allowed to depend on the composition of the budget set, one
can create examples where A2 is violated and the rest of the axioms are satisfied.
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• Consider a decision maker who stays with her status quo except once (c(Xx) =
y = x). This example violates A3 and satisfies the rest of the axioms.
• If one modifies the model and considers the one-step-limited search model
(search terminates after the first step, i.e., c(Sx) = argmax(∗(x) ∩ S)), this
model satisfies A1–A3, but violates A4.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of the “if” part is left to readers. Now suppose c satisfies A1–A4. For any
distinct x and y, define x and y:
xc y if x= c(S z) and y = c({y z} z) for some z = x and y ∈ S
Notice that this definition does not exclude the possibility that y is equal to z.
We now show that A1 guarantees thatc is acyclical. Assume c satisfies A1 andc is
cyclic. If elements of S form a cycle in terms of c , this means that for every alternative
x ∈ S, there exist zx and y ∈ S \ {x} such that c({xzx} zx) = x and y = c(T zx) for some
(T z), which violates A1. Hence, c cannot have a cycle.
Since c is acyclical, we can find a strict ranking  that includes c . Define ∗(x)≡
{y | c({x y}x) = y} and note that x ∈ ∗(x) for all x in X . Then (∗) generates a
Markovian CIS. Let us denote it by c∗: we will show that c∗ = c. First, we need to prove
several claims.
Claim 1. If c(Sx)= x, then c(Tx)= x whenever T ⊂ S.
Proof. Assume c(Sx) = x = c(Tx) and T ⊂ S. By A3, there exists z ∈ T \ x such that
c({xz}x) = z. By applying A4, c(Sx) = x and c({xz}x) = z imply c(S ∪ zx) = c(S ∪
z z). Since z also belongs to S (⊃ T ), then c(Sx)= c(S z). Hence c(S z)= x, and A1 is
violated because of c(S z)= x and c({xz}x)= z. 
Claim 2. We have∗(x)∩ S = {x} if and only if c(Sx)= x.
Proof. The equality S ∩ ∗(x) = {x} implies that x = c({x y}x) for all y ∈ S. Then, by
A3, we have c(Sx) = x. Alternatively, if c(Sx) = x, then, by Claim 1, x = c({x y}x) for
all y ∈ S. Hence S ∩∗(x)= {x}. 
Claim 3. Let x = y. Then c(Sx) = c({x y}x) = y and ∗(x) ∩ S = {x y} implies
c(Tx)= y whenever {x y} ⊂ T ⊂ S.
Proof. By A3, it is c(T ′ \ yx) = x because c({xz}x) = x for any z ∈ T ′ \ y by con-
struction of ∗ for any T ′ ⊂ S. Together with c({x y}x) = y, we can, in particular,
get c(S y) = c(Sx) = y and c(T y) = c(Tx) by A4. The former and Claim 1 imply
c(T y)= y, so it must be c(Tx)= y. 
Claim 4. Let x y z ∈ S be all distinct alternatives. If c(Sx) = c({x y}x) = y and z ∈
∗(x), then c(Tx)= c(T \ zx) for any T including x and y.
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Proof. By construction of ∗, we have z = c({xz}x), so we can get the desired result
by proving c({x y z}x)= y so that A2 is directly applicable. First note that c({x y z}x)
cannot be x because of Claim 2 (notice that y z ∈ ∗(x)). To see why it cannot be
z, if it were, it must be c({x y z}x) = c({xz}x) = z by A2 and z ∈ ∗(x). Thus, it
must be zc y. Alternatively, c({xz}x) = z and c(Sx) = y require y c z, which is a
contradiction. 
Claim 5. Let x = y. Then c(Sx) = c({x y}x) = y implies c(Tx) = y whenever {x y} ⊂
T ⊂ S.
Proof. Let Q= (∗(x)\ {x y})∩S. By applying Claim 4 repeatedly, c(T \Qx)= c(Tx)
and c(S \ Qx) = c(Sx) = y. Since T \ Q ⊂ S \ Q and (S \ Q) ∩ ∗(x) = {x y}, Claim 3
requires c(T \Qx)= y. Hence, c(Tx)= y. 
Claim 6. If x y, then c(Sx)= c(S ∪ yx).
Proof. Let
D = {(x yS) | x y and c(Sx) = c(S ∪ yx)}
Dmin = {(x yS) ∈D | there is no (x′ y ′ S′) ∈D and S′  S}
We show that Dmin is empty. Then D must be empty as well, which is the statement of
Claim 6.
Observation 1. If (x yS) ∈D, then (i) c(Tx) = y for any T , (ii) c({x y}x)= x, (iii) x,
y, c(Sx), c(S ∪ yx) are all distinct, and (iv) c({x c(S ∪ yx)}x)= x.
Proof. (i) If not, we have y c x, which contradicts x y.
(ii) This is just a special case of (i) when T = {x y}.
(iii) If either c(Sx) or c(S ∪ yx) is equal to y, it contradicts x  y. If x = c(Sx), by
(ii) and A3, we have x= c(Sx)= c(S ∪ yx), a contradiction. If x= c(S ∪ yx), by
Claim 1, we have x= c(Sx)= c(S ∪ yx), a contradiction.
(iv) If c({x c(S ∪ yx)}x) = c(S ∪ yx), by Claim 5, we have c(Sx) = c(S ∪ yx), a
contradiction. 
Observation 2. If (x yS) ∈Dmin, there exists unique t ∈ S \ x such that c({x t}x)= t.
Proof. Existence: Suppose there is no such t. Then c(Sx) = x by A3, which is a con-
tradiction (Observation 1(iii)).
Uniqueness: Suppose that there is another element t ′ ∈ S \ x such that c({x t ′}x)=
t ′. Then c({x t t ′x}x) = x by Claim 2. Without loss of generality, let c({x t t ′}x) =
c({x t}x) = t. Then by A2, c(Tx) = c(T ∪ t ′x) whenever t ∈ T . In particular, we have
c(S \ t ′x) = c(Sx) and c(S ∪ y \ t ′x) = c(S ∪ yx). Since c(Sx) = c(S ∪ yx), we have
c(S \ t ′x) = c(S ∪ y \ t ′x). Thus, (x yS \ t ′) ∈D, which contradicts (x yS) ∈Dmin. 
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Observation 3. If (x yS) ∈Dmin, and we let z = c(Sx) and z′ = c(S ∪ yx), then there
existsw ∈ S \z such that (wyS) ∈Dmin, c({wz}w)= z, z = c(Sw), and z′ = c(S∪yw).
Proof. The easy case: If z = c({xz}x), then let w = x.
The difficult case: Suppose x = c({xz}x). By Observation 2, S \ x has only one el-
ement t such that t = c({x t}x). Thus, A3 implies c(S \ t x) = x, so c(Sx) = c(S t) by
A4. Similarly, we get c(S ∪ yx) = c(S ∪ y t) because c({x y}x) = x by Observation 1.
Therefore, we have z = c(S t) = c(S ∪ y t) = z′. Furthermore, it must be that t  y be-
cause tc x y. Hence, (t y S) ∈Dmin. Applying Observation 1(iii), it must be that t = z
so t = c({x t}x) and z = c(Sx) implies zc t. Thus, it must be that z  t  x.
If z = c({t z} t), then let w = t. If t = c({t z} t), repeating this argument (the dif-
ficult case), we can find another t ′ ∈ S \ x such that (t ′ y S) ∈ Dmin and z  t ′  t. If
t ′ = c({t ′ z} t ′), repeat this process. Each time, we find a better alternative than the pre-
vious one, so this case cannot be repeated forever. At some point, we must go to the easy
case. 
Given these observations, we complete the proof of the claim. Suppose (x yS) ∈
Dmin and z = c(Sx), z′ = c(S ∪ yx). Let w be the element satisfying the conditions
in Observation 3. By Observation 1 and Observation 2, c({wz}w) = z ( = w) and
c({ww′}w)=w for all w′ ∈ S \z. Together with c({wy}w))=w, A3 implies c(Tw)=w
for any T ⊂ S ∪ y, so it must be c(Tw) = c(T z) by A4. In particular, consider T = S,
S ∪ y, and {wy z}. Then we have c(S z)= c(Sw)= z, c(S ∪ y z)= c(S ∪ yw)= z′, and
c({wy z} z)= c({wy z}w). By Claim 2, c({wy z}w) is not w because c({wz}w) =
z and is not y because w  y, so it is z. Applying A3 to the first and the third, we get
c(S ∪ y z)= z, which is a contradiction. 
We next define the concept of replacement of a dominated starting point. That is,
if y is a replacement of x at S, then (i) the DM will reach the final choice in both deci-
sion problems (Tx) and (T y) for all subsets of S, including both x and y, and (ii) any
alternative in ∗ cannot be chosen when the starting point is y. The formal statement
follows.
Definition 1. Suppose c(Sx) = x. Then y ∈ S \ x is called a replacement of x at S if
and only if (i) c(Tx) = c(T y) for any T such that {x y} ⊂ T ⊂ S and (ii) for any z ∈ S if
c({xz}x)= z, then c({y z} y)= y.
Claim 7. Any replacement of x at S belongs to ∗(x).
Proof. Let y be one of the replacements of x at S. Definition 1(i) implies that c({x y}
x) = c({x y} y). Substituting z = x into Definition 1(ii) says that if c({xx}x) = x (al-
ways true), then c({x y} y)= y. Hence, it must be that c({x y}x)= y, i.e., y ∈∗(x). 
Claim 8. Suppose c(Sx) = x. Then c(S ∩∗(x)x) is the unique replacement for x in S.
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Proof. By Claim 2, we have S ∩∗(x) = x. Let y = c(S ∩∗(x)x). Then y must be the
-best element in S ∩ ∗(x). This is because y = c({x y z}x) for all z ∈ S ∩ ∗(x) by
Claim 5. Hence, we have yc z for all z ∈∗(x) \ y. Since  is a completion ofc , y must
be the -best element in S ∩∗(x).
Next, we prove that y satisfies Definition 1(i) and (ii). Take any T such that {x y} ⊂
T ⊂ S. Let
T ′ = (T \∗(x))∪ {x y}
By the definition of ∗, T ′ contains only one element (y) such that the DM is willing to
move from x in a pairwise comparison (c(T ′ \ yx)= x). Thus, A4 implies
c(T ′x)= c(T ′ y)
Since we have y c z for all z ∈ ∗(x) \ y, by applying Claim 6 recursively, we have
c(T ′ y) = c(T y). Similarly, since c({x y z}x) = c({x y}x) for all z ∈ ∗(x) \ y, by
applying A2 recursively, we have c(T ′x) = c(Tx). Thus, we have c(Tx) = c(T y) so
y satisfies Definition 1(i). To see Definition 1(ii), notice that the presumption implies
z ∈ ∗(x), so if it was z = c({y z} y), then we would have z c y, but we have already
shown that y c z for all z ∈∗(x)∩ x \ y, which contradicts A1.
Now, we show the uniqueness. Suppose z = y = c(S ∩∗(x)x) is the replacement.
Then it must be that z ∈∗(x) by Claim 7. We have already proven that c({x y z}x)= y.
Since z satisfies Definition 1(i), we must have c({x y z} z) = y. The axiom A3 and z ∈
∗(x) imply c({y z} z) = y. This contradicts the fact that z ∈ ∗(x) and Definition 1(ii)
imply c({y z} z)= z. 
Claim 9. We have c(S ∩∗(x)x)= c∗(S ∩∗(x)x) for any (Sx).
Proof. If S ∩∗(x) includes only x, the statement is trivial, so assume that it includes
some elements other than x, hence c(S ∩∗(x)x) = x by Claim 2. Let y be the -best
element in S ∩∗(x). By definition of c∗, y = c∗(S ∩∗(x)x). Suppose c(S ∩∗(x)x)=
z = y. Since c(S ∩∗(x)x) = x, Claim 8 implies that z is a replacement for x in both S
and S∩∗(x) (since (S∩∗(x))∩∗(x)= S∩∗(x)). By the definition of a replacement,
c({x y z}x)= c({x y z} z).
We also know that c({y z} z)= z for all y ∈ S∩∗(x), since z is a replacement. By A3,
we have c(S ∩∗(x) z) = z. By Claim 5, c({x y z} z) = z, so c({x y z}x) = z. Alterna-
tively, y = c({x y}x) since y ∈∗(x). These two imply zc y, i.e., z  y. This contradicts
that y is the -best element within S ∩∗(x). 
Claim 10. We have c(Sx)= c∗(Sx) for any (Sx).
Proof. For any S, make its partition recursively as
IS0 = {x ∈ S | S ∩∗(x)= {x}}
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and
ISk = {x ∈ S \ (IS0 ∪ · · · ∪ ISk−1) |∗(x)∩ S ⊂ {x} ∪ IS0 ∪ · · · ∪ ISk−1}
We prove the assertion of Claim 10 by induction. Take any x ∈ IS0 . Then we have x =
c∗(Sx). By Claim 2, c(Sx)= x as well.
Now assume c = c∗ for any x ∈ ISk′ with k′ ≤ k− 1. We show that c(Sx)= c∗(Sx) for
any x ∈ ISk .
Since k > 0, S ∩∗(x) includes some element other than x. Therefore, by Claim 2, it
cannot be that x= c(Sx). Let y be the -best element in S ∩∗(x). Then by definition
of c∗, we have y = c∗(S ∩∗(x)x) and c∗(Sx)= c∗(S y). Then
c(Sx) = c(S c(S ∩∗(x)x)) by Claim 8
= c(S c∗(S ∩∗(x)x)) by Claim 9
= c(S y)
Finally, since x ∈ ISk and y ∈ S∩∗(x), it must be that y ∈ ISl for some l < k. Therefore,
by the inductive hypothesis, we have c(S y)= c∗(S y). Therefore, c(Sx)= c∗(Sx). 
By Claim 10, we have reached the required result.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The only-if part is shown in the main body, so here we give the proof of the if part. Take
any completion of ′c , denoted by . We show that c = c(∗).
Case 1: c(Sx)= x. Take any element y ∈∗(x)∩ S (y = x) if any. By the definition of
′c , we have x ′c y, so it must be that x y. Thus, c(∗)(Sx)= x.
Case 2: c(Sx) = y = x. Then we show that c(Sx) = c(Sx′), where x′ is the -best
element in ∗(x)∩ S. By recursively applying this result, we can conclude that c(Sx)=
c(∗)(Sx).
Claims 7 and 8 in the proof of Theorem 2 show that if S′ = {a ∈ S|c({ax}x)= a} and
z = c(S′x), then (a) z = x, (b) c(Tx) = c(T z) for all T ⊂ S, and (c) c({az} z) = z for
any a ∈ S′.
We show that z is the -best element in ∗(x) ∩ S. It is easy to see that z ∈ ∗(x)
because c({xz}x) = z (by definition of S′ and the contrapositive of Proposition 2(ii)).
Thus, we only need to show z  a for all a ∈∗(x)∩ S \ {z}.
If a ∈ S′, then it must be that a ∈ ∗(x) as well, so it must be that z ′c a, so z  a. If
a /∈ S′, then it must be that x′c a because c({ax}x) = x. (Let z = x into the definition
of ′c .) Since z ′c x (because x ∈ S′), we obtain z ′c x′c a. Thus, it must be that z  a.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose choice correspondence C is induced by a CIS represented by (). Then the
-best element in S is a bliss point of S. This is because, for any T ⊂ S, (·T ) never
includes an element that is -better than x, so x= c(Tx) for all T ⊂ S (as long as x ∈ T ).
Thus, we have x ∈ C(T) for any T ⊂ S including x.
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Conversely, let C satisfy the BP axiom. To construct  from the choice correspon-
dence, we utilize the notion of bliss points. The BP axiom guarantees the existence of
a bliss point in any choice problem, particularly in X . Since bliss points of X are never
eliminated, it is natural to put them on the top of the ranking. In the next step, remove all
the bliss points of X from X . Now consider bliss points of this strictly smaller set, and
put them into the second layer and so on. Formally, we recursively define , starting
from the grand set X , and construct a partition of X . Let X =X0 and
I0 = {x ∈X0 | x ∈ C(T) for all T s.t. x ∈ T ⊂X0}
Note that I0 is the set of bliss points of X0. BP implies that I0 is nonempty. Define
X1 =X0 \ I0. If it is nonempty, define
I1 = {x ∈X1 | x ∈ C(T) for all T s.t. x ∈ T ⊂X1}
BP also implies that I1 is nonempty. Then recursively define
Ik = {x ∈Xk | x ∈ C(T) for all T s.t. x ∈ T ⊂Xk}
where Xk = Xk−1 \ Ik−1, until
⋃
Ik = X . Note that {In} is a partition of X and that the
Xn’s are nested. Given the partition {In}, define x y if x ∈ Ik, y ∈ Il, and k < l. Since X
is finite, this recursive process ends in finite time. Since it is incomplete as of now, take
any completion of it. By construction,  is a preference. Now define
(AS)=
{
A∪ {yS} if A= {x} and x /∈ C(S)
A otherwise,
where yS is the -best element in S with yS  x. Note that A⊂(AS)⊂ S for all A⊂ S.
Let c be a CIS represented by (). We need to show that c induces C. Take any
x ∈ S. If x ∈ C(S), then x = c(Sx) because ({x} S) = {x}, so x ∈ Cc(S). Alternatively,
suppose x ∈ Cc(S). Since Cc(S)= C(S)∪ {yS}, we can conclude that x ∈ C(S) by showing
yS ∈ C(S). Suppose yS ∈ Ik. Since yS is the -best element in S, then S ⊂Xk by definition
of . Since yS is a bliss point of Xk, it must be that yS ∈ C(S). Therefore, we conclude
that C(S)= Cc(S).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We first prove a claim.
Claim 11. Let c be a Markovian CIS. Then c(S y)= x implies c(Sx)= x.
Proof. Assume c(S y) = x and that c is represented by (), where  is defined by
(1). As we showed before, under the Markovian structure, the search stops whenever
the best item so far is also the best within its own consideration set. Hence x is the best
alternative in ∗(x)∩ S. Then when we consider the choice problem (Sx), we have
({x} S)= (∗(x)∩ S)∪ {x} =∗(x)∩ S =(∗(x)∩ SS)
Therefore, x is the best alternative in the final consideration set for the choice problem
(Sx), i.e., c(Sx)= x. 
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Now suppose choice correspondence Cc is induced by a Markovian CIS, c, repre-
sented by (∗). Then define xP y if x= c({x y}x) for any distinct x and y. By A1, P is
acyclical. Let C be represented by P . We need to show that c induces C. Take any x ∈ S.
If x ∈ C(S), then there exists no y ∈ S such that y P x. By definition of P , x = c({x y}x)
for all y ∈ S. By A3, we have c(Sx) = x, so x ∈ Cc(S). Alternatively, suppose x ∈ Cc(S).
That is, there exists z ∈ S such that c(S z) = x. By Claim 11, we have c(Sx) = x. By
Claim 1, we have c({x y}x)= x for all y ∈ S. Hence, there is no y ∈ S with y P x, x ∈ C(S).
Therefore, we conclude that C(S)= Cc(S).
Conversely, let C be represented by an acyclical binary relation P . Take any prefer-
ence  including P and define ∗(x) = {y ∈ X | y P x}. Let c be a Markovian CIS repre-
sented by (∗). Again we need to show that c induces C. Take any x ∈ S. If x ∈ C(S),
then ∗(x) ∩ S =∅ by the definition of ∗. Hence c(Sx)= x, so x ∈ Cc(S). If x ∈ Cc(S),
then there exists z ∈ S such that c(S z)= x. By Claim 11, we have c(Sx)= x. Therefore,
there exists no y ∈ ∗(x) ∩ S such that y  x. By P ⊂ and the definition of ∗, that is
equivalent to saying that there exists no y ∈ S such that y P x, so x ∈ C(S). Therefore, we
conclude that C(S)= Cc(S).
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